

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
42D ENGINEER COMPANY, BERLIN BRIGADE
APO 09742

9 July 1970

SUBJECT: Quarterly Report of Status/Activities
Second Quarter, Calendar Year 1970

TO: Commanding General
Berlin Brigade
ATTN: G3 (Command Historian)
APO NY 09742

1. As of the last day of June 1970, the 42d Engineer Company was commanded by Captain Frederick H. Anderson. He assumed command of the company from Captain Raymond P. Miller on 10 June 1970.
2. At the end of the reporting period, the operational strength of the company was four (4) officers and one-hundred and forty-eight (148) enlisted men, for a total of one-hundred and fifty-two (152) men.
3. During the reporting period, two traffic accidents occurred, both involving one combat engineer vehicle, M728. Both accidents involved the same vehicle and driver. Both were minor, one with no property damage and one with thirty dollars (\$30.00) damage. Neither involved injuries to personnel. The cause of these accidents was attributed to the inexperience of the driver in a civilian environment, i.e., the streets of Berlin. This situation has been alleviated by giving the individual more experience under close supervision, and securing drivers' licenses for the more experienced personnel in the CEV section.
4. Discipline/Military Justice: Non-Judicial: Eleven (11) Article 15's.
5. On 23 May 1970, the CEV section participated in the Allied Forces Day Parade with one M728 CEV. Only one CEV participated, due to an accident involving the other CEV while en route to the parade (ref. p. 2). No other problems were encountered.
6. During the second quarter of calendar 1970, the 42d Engineer Company participated in various types of training in the field in order to maintain its combat readiness and provide engineer support to the brigade.
 - a) The first platoon conducted engineer training and provided engineer support to the 4/18th Infantry at the Hohenfels Training Area during the period 13 April to 13 May 1970.

The engineer training consisted of demolitions, mine warfare, rigging, and bridging. The bridging involved construction of a timber trestle bridge entirely from natural materials on Range 60. This is unusual, due to the difficulty in securing materials for bridge construction at this training area. However, permission was secured from Range Control to use dead timber at Range 60 for this purpose. The other platoons will attempt to use this same source of materials in future trips to the MTA, but the supply is very limited so its usefulness will be for a short time only. During the training period the platoon provided support to the battalion during an ATT and a Pre-ATT.

b) Problem areas encountered were the same as those encountered by the other platoons during training periods in the MTA. Most support missions required by the battalion exceeded the capabilities of an engineer platoon. For example, minefields and barriers were to be established, but to install these in a realistic period of time would have required at least a company. Other jobs required heavy equipment not organic to an engineer platoon.


c) During the period of 25-27 May 1970, the 42d Engineer Company participated in FTX Cartridge IV, a brigade FTX. The highlight of this exercise for the engineer company was an amphibious assault across the Wannsee River conducted the morning of 26 May 1970. Nine 18' assault boats and a class 60 heavy raft were secured for this purpose from the 38th Field Squadron, Royal Engineers, of the British Army. The engineer company spent the two weeks prior to the FTX training on this equipment under the supervision of the British Engineers. The 4/18th Infantry crossed by assault boat, and the vehicles, belonging to the 3/6 Infantry, crossed on the heavy raft, plus a tank retriever and several other miscellaneous vehicles.

d) During the rest of the FTX, the company maintained the MSR and acted as the Brigade Reserve during an attack the morning of the last day.

e) During the FTX, the company was left intact under the control of the company commander. For previous FTX's, the platoons were usually detached, one per infantry battalion. This was deemed unsatisfactory because platoons were often incapable of rendering the required support due to a lack of heavy equipment and personnel (ref. p. 6b). At other times the platoon was left with nothing to do, and so, just followed along with the battalion headquarters element. During this FTX, with the company intact, the company was able to provide all required engineer support, and kept its platoons busy most of the time.

f) Two problem areas were encountered during FTX Cartridge IV. The first was a lack of prior coordination for the amphibious assault. The engineer company was authorized to co-ordinate directly with the British, which was done with great success. However, no coordination was accomplished by higher headquarters between the engineers and the infantry involved in the assault prior to the morning of the attack. The Infantry simply showed up at the near-shore sites, and all coordination was accomplished at that time.

There was little confusion on the beach, but a great deal in the assembly areas until the infantry officers had been briefed as to what had to be done. The other problem areas had to do with priorities assigned to tasks to be accomplished by the engineer company. All tasks were assigned a priority of one, although some were obviously more urgent than others. Both of these problems were outlined in more detail in the After-Action Report, and solutions are being considered.



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Unit Historian

